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Abstract
There has been a profound change in the communication strategy of central banks
since the Great Recession. Besides offering guidance on the path of the policy rate,
central banks have also started releasing news on uncertainty about the economic out-
look to the public. Has this enhanced communication strategy, which we define as
comprehensive, proven effective in anchoring inflation expectations? To address this
question, we let a central bank communicate noisy information on the multiple shocks
that hit the economy via its comprehensive strategy. At the same time, agents update
their beliefs in a Bayesian way and infer the shocks for which the central bank has been
informed about. We show that a comprehensive central bank communication strategy
renders certain inflation paths incompatible with equilibrium conditions, facilitating,
therefore, the anchoring of inflation expectations.
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1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, the role of central bank communication has taken centre stage
in policy debates. The communication strategies of major central banks have radically
shifted towards greater transparency, and wider and deeper engagement with the public.
Especially during and after the Great Recession, communication has become a policy tool
in its own right. Understanding how communication shapes market outcomes is therefore
of high importance.
There is a recent trend among central banks towards greater transparency (Table 1).
Specifically, in August 2013, the Bank of England introduced explicit state-contingent for-
ward guidance, and since March 2015 it releases the minutes of its policy meetings and the
Inflation Report1 at the same time as its policy decisions;2 since 2012, the Federal Reserve
adopted an explicit inflation target of 2%, began publishing its members’ individual pro-
jections for the federal funds target rate (dot plot), introduced a mix of state-contingent
and date-based forward guidance, and since 2017 it start publishing fan charts to their
economic forecasts and the risk assessment of the FOMC members around projections.3
In 2001, the Bank of Japan introduced state-contingent guidance, in 2013 it adopted an ex-
plicit inflation target of 2%, and in 2015 it stepped up its communication by releasing each
Policy Board member’s forecast and risk assessment of the economic outlook;4 in 2013,
the European Central Bank offered forward guidance on the future path of its key interest
rates, and in 2014 it start publishing more detailed background for its forecasts.5 The up-
shot is that announcements about the future path of the policy rate have been enhanced
1The Inflation Report contains the projections for GDP and inflation of the MPC committee; and presents
these projections in the form of fan charts (with information on the variance and the skew).
2See Warsh (2014), Bank of England (2014) and Haldane (2017) for details on the changes of the Bank’s
communication framework.
3In fact, Mester (2016) recommended that the FOMC should publish distributional information and risk
assessments of its members; and Chair Yellen used distributional information in her speech at Jackson Hall
in 2016 (Yellen, 2016). For a graphical illustration of risk and uncertainty assessments, see, for example, the
Summary of Economic Projections that accompany the minutes of the December 2019 FOMC meeting.
4See Bank of Japan (2015) for details on how each member’s risk assessment is released.
5Since December 2013, the ECB staff macroeconomic projections are complemented with fan charts on
inflation and GDP forecasts; see European Central Bank (2016) for the timeline of these changes.
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with (simultaneous) announcements containing news on uncertainty about the economic
outlook. We define the combination of announcements about the future path of the pol-
icy rate and information on uncertainty about the economic outlook as comprehensive
communication.
In light of these profound changes, we offer a novel characterisation in favour of greater
transparency. In our set up, conventional monetary policy targets expected inflation (in
deviation from its target) with a Taylor-type rule. Comprehensive communication takes
the form of announcements about the central bank’s forecasts of expected inflation (in-
formation on levels) and the variance of inflation (news on uncertainty). This strategy is
closer to the Bank of England’s framework, where the members of the Monetary Policy
Committee agree on a single fan chart that represents their best collective judgement about
the current and future economic conditions. Therefore we abstract from dispersion of be-
liefs among members of the committee, as it is reflected in the announcements of other
central banks. The contribution of this paper is to draw attention to the effectiveness of
comprehensive communication in anchoring inflation to its target.
We consider a stochastic, infinite-horizon environment where the central bank receives
noisy signals about the state of the economy, and in the absence of any information trans-
mission, there exist multiple inflation paths that support the (unique) real allocation. The
multiplicity does not derive from the indeterminacy of a steady state, in which case it is
well-known that active policy rules restore determinacy. We take our cue from Nakajima
and Polemarchakis (2005), who showed that in finite or infinite horizon stochastic mone-
tary economies, interest rate or money supply policies do not suffice to determine the “dis-
tribution” of inflation across date-events.6 The role of communication is to anchor beliefs
to the inflation path closest to, or at the policy target. Information exchange takes place be-
tween two rational agents: the central bank and a representative agent. The central bank
announces its posterior beliefs to the agent, updating takes place and information sets are
equalised. Announcements convey information on the fundamentals, which allow agents
to infer that certain inflation paths are not feasible—violate equilibrium conditions—and
the dimension of the indeterminacy is reduced.
6See Castillo-Martinez and Reis (2019) for a relevant discussion of this type of indeterminacy.
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Comprehensive communication is necessary when the state of the economy consists of
multiple shocks—here, demand and supply shocks. Announcements containing forecasts
of expected inflation lead to an identification problem: they map to a noisy signal at the
central bank’s information set which might convey information on demand or supply or
both shocks. Without exact identification, announcements are not informative and an-
choring of inflation fails. Therefore, additional information on higher moments is needed.
Our comprehensive framework is related to the work of Hansen et al. (2019), who showed
that news on uncertainty, extracted from the Bank of England’s Inflation Report, have big
effects along the yield curve. In the present setting, we characterise how news on uncer-
tainty can anchor the stochastic path of inflation.
We focus on linear rational expectations equilibria, where inflation consists of two com-
ponents: the first depends on past and contemporaneous shocks, while the second de-
pends on expectations of future shocks. Multiplicity arises because dependence on some
of the shocks is not restricted by equilibrium conditions without information away from
priors. The variance of inflation is a linear function of its two components. We define
as “fundamental uncertainty” the variance of the first component, which is determined
unambiguously with the arrival of information and places a lower bound on the inflation
variance; and we define as “reducible uncertainty” the variance of the second compo-
nent, which depends arbitrarily on expectations of future shocks, and goes to zero with
improvements of information over longer horizons. Taking advantage of linearity, infor-
mation (only) on “fundamental uncertainty” allow agents to solve the identification prob-
lem; and forecasts of expected inflation allow agents to back out the signals for which the
central bank has been informed. Hence, updating of beliefs about shocks add additional
equilibrium restrictions and anchoring takes place.7
At each date, the central bank announces its forecasts about fundamental uncertainty
over the entire horizon. Identification works through a static and a dynamic channel. The
static channel works as follows. The agent compares each element of the announced vec-
tor of forecasts with announcements that correspond to different partitions of the central
bank’s information set, in order to infer if the central bank has received information about
7These notions of “uncertainty” are adapted from the work of Hansen et al. (2019).
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one or both shocks or any information at all. Subsequently, static identification proceeds
through elimination. For example, if each element is consistent with information on both
shocks, then it should not be equal to zero (no signals whatsoever) or be consistent with
information on only one of the shocks.
Next, in our dynamic framework, the agent needs to identify also the information hori-
zon, as of the current date, for which the central bank has received noisy information, in
order to update beliefs about the inflation path. To explain the dynamic channel, we use
the following example. Suppose the central bank receives noisy information τ periods
ahead every time. Then, announcements up to and including τ periods ahead consist of
prior variances plus the non-zero change in variance attributed to the arrival of informa-
tion in the current period, while announcements from τ + 1 onwards are equal to prior
variances only, reflecting the fact that additional information will arrive in the future, but
it is not available yet. Dynamic identification proceeds by comparing the non-zero change
in variance between announcements up to τ periods ahead and announcements from τ+1
onwards, as of the current date.8
Related Literature
Our work is related to the literature on communication and transparency. The seminal
work of Morris and Shin (2002) showed that public information can reduce welfare when
private information is precise. Angeletos and Pavan (2007) clarified that this arises be-
cause of misaligned incentives between individuals and the social planner in the use of
information.9 Gaballo (2016) studied the link between central bank communication and
rational inattention, and showed that information can be welfare reducing by increasing
the volatility of prices. Bassetto (2019) considered a cheap talk game between agents and
the central bank, and showed that communication has social value when the central bank
has private information. Here, we abstract from strategic interactions, incomplete infor-
8Dynamic identification is related to the methodology of identification through heteroskedasticity
(Rigobon, 2003).
9Other contributions include Angeletos et al. (2013), Hellwig (2005), Myatt and Wallace (2014), Morris
and Shin (2005).
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mation and costs of processing information. Our framework follows the methodology of
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982), where rational agents announce posteriors and
agreement is reached. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the link be-
tween communication and multiplicity of equilibria; and characterise how greater trans-
parency reduces multiplicity.
The literature on multiplicity in rational expectation monetary models is extensive.10
As we already discussed, we take our cue from Nakajima and Polemarchakis (2005), who
index indeterminacy with the distribution of the price of state-contingent nominal bonds.
In that context, Ada˜o et al. (2014) and Magill and Quinzii (2014) showed that fixing the
term structure of interest rates determines the path of inflation; and Dreze and Polemar-
chakis (2001) argued that fixing the interest rate or the money supply, and the price of
Arrow securities, determines the distribution of inflation.
The notion of comprehensive communication is related to the so-called “Delphic” for-
ward guidance, which Campbell et al. (2012) defined as the announcements of forecast of
macroeconomic outcomes and likely monetary policy actions. Our results highlight the
importance of “Delphic” guidance in anchoring the path of inflation. Finally, the commu-
nication channel we propose is important if one takes into account the increasing evidence
that uncertainty has macroeconomic effects (Bloom, 2009; Baker et al., 2016; Fernandez-
Villaverde et al., 2011).
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model, where fluctua-
tions are driven only by TFP; section 3 characterises communication in the basic model;
section 4 incorporates demand shocks and characterises comprehensive communication;
section 5 discusses extensions; section 6 concludes; and, Appendix A includes derivations.
10Other notable contributions include Woodford (1994), Sargent and Wallace (1975), McCallum (1981),
Clarida et al. (2000), Cochrane (2011), Ascari et al. (2019), Castillo-Martinez and Reis (2019).
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2 The Model
Log-linear environment
Consider a frictionless, cashless, representative agent economy. Time is discrete and ex-
tends to infinity. The equilibrium conditions in log-linear form are given by
yt = at, (1)
it − Et [pit+1] = Et [yt+1]− yt, (2)
where y denotes output, a productivity, i the nominal interest rate, pi denotes inflation
(lowercase variables refer to logs).11 (1)-(2), respectively, denote market clearing and the
Euler equation (stochastic Fisher equation).
The central bank (CB) sets the nominal interest rate according to an interest-rate rule
that is known to agents. Let the CB target expected inflation with a zero-inflation target:
it = φEt [pit+1] + vt, (3)
where φ 6= 1, φ ≥ 0 and v denotes the monetary policy shock. Eqs. (2)-(3) imply the Euler
equation can be rewritten as
Et [pit+1] =
1
φ− 1 (Et [at+1] − at − vt) . (E)
Shocks processes and announcements
We assume that log-productivity, at , follows a white noise process:
at = t , (4)
where  is i.i.d. with  ∼ N(0, σ2 ) . Also, v is i.i.d. with v ∼ N(0, σ2v). The CB receives
information on productivity with noisy signals
st+τ = at+τ + et+τ , (5)
where st+τ refers to a noisy signal about productivity in period t+ τ , with τ ≥ 1, and e is
an i.i.d. noise shock with e ∼ N(0, σ2e) and σe finite. The two shocks  and e are mutually
11Appendix A.1 offers details.
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independent, and so are they with the policy shock v . We assume that all agents have
common priors on productivity and policy shocks, and the representative agent knows
the distribution of noise.
All agents in the economy are Bayesian and, hence, in the presence of a noisy signal
about the productivity innovation in t+ τ , their expectations of it are
Et [at+τ ] = µ st+τ , (6)
with µ = (1 + σ2e/σ2 )
−1.
We focus on indirect exchange of information, where the CB communications informa-
tion on productivity innovations through announcements about its systematic component
of monetary policy; moreover, the CB makes announcements about its non-systematic
component. Let p¯it+τ,t denote the CB’s forecast as of t about expected inflation (systematic
component) at t + τ , and vt+τ,t be its announcement as of t about policy shocks (non-
systematic component) at t + τ. The CB is transparent with respect to information trans-
mission, so that announcements contain all that there is to know about its information set,
without hiding or containing arbitrary information.
The information sets of the representative agent (RA) and the CB in period t are given
by
ΩRAt = {(. . . , at−1 , at), (. . . , vt+τ,t), (. . . , p¯it+τ+1,t, . . . )} , τ ≥ 1
ΩCBt = {(. . . , at−1 , at), (. . . , vt+τ,t), (. . . , st+τ,t)} , τ ≥ 1.
(7)
The mathematical expectation of a variable X as of date t is taken with respect to informa-
tion contained in Ωt, that is, Et [X] = E [X|Ωt]. In equilibrium, following CB announce-
ments, the information sets of both agents are identical and posterior beliefs coincide.
Linear Rational Expectations Equilibria
We focus on linear rational expectations equilibria (LREE). To this end, we consider con-
jectures of inflation of the following form:
pit+1 =
∞∑
j=0
θjEt+1 [at+j] +
∞∑
j=0
$jEt+1 [vt+j] , (C1)
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where θ’s and $’s are time-invariant coefficients that correspond to the productivity and
monetary policy shocks respectively. More specifically, the coefficients are determined,
if possible, by matching expected inflation generated by conjecture (C1) with the Euler
equation (E).
(C1) requires inflation to depend on past and contemporaneous shocks, but also on
expectations on future shocks. However, expectations are deviations from the prior mean
which, in that case, is zero. Communication perturbs expectations away from its prior
mean and, hence, they matters for inflation determination.
Some remarks are in order. First, the representation in (C1) is not unique. Specifically, in
Section 5 we consider conjectures that correspond to alternative shocks processes and an
interest rate rule that targets current inflation, and show that all our results remain intact.
Second, in order to isolate and highlight the role of information transmission in anchoring
the distribution of inflation, we restrict the analysis to conjectures that depend only on
fundamental and monetary policy shocks, for which the central bank either receives noisy
information or can manipulate with its own actions, and show that communication pins
down the stochastic path of inflation.12
Benchmark of “no communication”
To motivate the importance of information transmission and illustrate our main point, we
analyse first the benchmark case of ”no communication”. The agent’s current information
set includes current and past realisations of productivity and policy shocks, and agents
beliefs coincide with the priors.
Consider the following result.
Proposition 1. Under the benchmark of “no communication”, the stochastic path of inflation is
indeterminate, with indeterminacy indexed by the pair (θ1, $1) .
12We do not index the inflation conjecture with arbitrary white noise processes (“sunspots”). In that
case, it is well-known that determinacy obtains by combining (1), (2) with a current inflation targeting rule
that satisfies the Taylor principle, and also imposing a terminal condition on the inflation path. See Castillo-
Martinez and Reis (2019) for an explanation of the so-called elusive terminal condition; and Cochrane (2011)
for a critique of this argument.
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The proof is as follows. Take expectations of (C1) as of date t and match coefficients
with the Euler equation (E). It follows that
θ0 = $0 = − 1
φ− 1 (8)
and coefficients (θj, $j) for all j ≥ 1 are not determined given that expectations of shocks
are consistent with the prior mean and, hence, these coefficients vanish when we match
expectations of (C1) with (E).
The stochastic path of inflation reduces to
pit+1 = − 1
φ− 1 ( at + vt) + θ1 at+1 +$1vt+1, (9)
where the pair (θ1, $1) takes arbitrary values. Hence, the distribution of inflation across
date-events is indeterminate.
Communication policies
The objective of communication is to anchor inflation expectations and determine the
stochastic path of inflation. Since productivity is the only driver in the basic model—apart
from monetary policy shocks—, we provide the following definition of “simple commu-
nication”, as follows:
Definition 1. (Simple Communication)
1. (Commitment) Binding announcements about deviations from systematic policy up to τ pe-
riods ahead, (vt+1,t, ...., vt+τ,t), as of date t;
2. (Forecasts) Non-binding announcements about the systematic policy component for the en-
tire horizon, (p¯it+1,t, ...., p¯it+τ,t, ....), as of date t.
Taken together, commitments about deviations from inflation targeting and forecasts
about expected inflation amount to announcements about the path of the expected nom-
inal interest rate, (it, Et (it+1) , Et (it+2) , ....). Following Campbell et al. (2012), the distinc-
tion between commitment and forecasts in our set-up map to their distinction between
Odyssean and Delphic forward guidance respectively.
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Information on productivity innovations is transmitted via the interest rate rule and
the stochastic Fisher equation. In particular, following an announcements from the central
bank, the agents update beliefs about productivity through (E), and backs out the exact
value of noisy signals. Inference in our set up requires Delphic guidance and cannot be
made possible with Odyssean commitments.13
The previous discussion leads to the following result.
Proposition 2. Under simple communication, the agent backs out the noisy signals for which the
central bank has been informed.
Suppose the central bank receives noisy information about productivity innovations τ
periods ahead. Consider the following announcements:
(vt+1,t, ...., vt+τ,t) ,
and
(p¯it+1,t, ...., p¯it+τ+1,t, 0, 0, ....) ,
with Delphic announcements up to, and including τ + 1 different from zero, and with
zeros indicating that information beyond this point coincides with priors. Optimality
conditions (E), as of date t, reduce to
p¯it+1,t =
1
φ− 1 [Et[at+1] − at − vt], (10)
...
p¯it+τ+1,t =
1
φ− 1 [Et[at+τ+1 − at+τ ]− vt+τ,t] , (11)
p¯it+τ+2,t = p¯it+τ+3,t = . . . = 0. (12)
Combining announcements with (10) and (6), agents update beliefs on productivity
innovations at t + 1 and back out the signal st+1. Subsequently, iterating forward up to τ
13However, see Nakamura and Steinsson (2018), who characterised the effect of communication on long-
run expectations in a stylised New Keynesian model, where monetary policy shocks transmit information
on fundamentals.
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periods ahead, and combining it with announcements and (6), they back out all remaining
signals (st+2, ...., st+τ ). Moreover, it follows from (11) that expected inflation τ + 1 periods
ahead is consistent withEt[at+τ+1] = 0, and announcements p¯it+τ+1 have to be nonzero and
consistent with signal st+τ and Odyssean commitment vt+τ,t. Finally, it follows from (12)
and the commitment horizon that beliefs on productivity innovations beyond τ periods
ahead coincide with priors. It is important to note that this argument does not require
deviations from systematic policy—however, at the end of section 3, we argue that in the
presence of the zero lower bound, these deviations are important.
3 Simple communication
Suppose the central bank possesses noisy information about productivity τ periods ahead;
and, at the beginning of each period, it receives additional noisy signals so that the infor-
mation horizon is kept constant to τ periods ahead. Announcements consists of commit-
ments about non-systematic deviations up to τ periods ahead, and (nonzero) forecasts
up to τ + 1 periods ahead. The central bank refines its own forecasts each period, keep-
ing its non-zero forecasts horizon to τ + 1 periods, and makes additional commitments,
keeping its commitment horizon to τ periods. We speak of asymptotic communication,
when τ →∞ and the central bank wants to transmit information about the entire path of
innovations; in that case, it refines its forecasts every period.
Let us start with announcements involving commitments to deviate from systematic
policy in the future.
Proposition 3. Under announcements (vt+1,t, ...., vt+τ,t), the stochastic path of inflation is in-
determinate, with indeterminacy indexed by the pair (θ1, $τ+1). As τ → ∞, indeterminacy is
indexed by θ1.
The argument is as follows. Suppose the central bank, as of date t, commits to a se-
quence of policy shocks (vt+1,t, ...., vt+τ,t). Combining these announcements with (E) and
with expectation, as of date t, of (C1), and matching coefficients, it follows that
θ0 = $0 = − 1
φ− 1 and $1 = · · · = $τ = 0;
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and state contingent inflation is equal to
pit+1 = − 1
φ− 1 ( at + vt) + θ1 at+1 +$τ+1vt+τ+1.
Announcements perturb expectations of agents about future policy shocks away from
priors and add additional equilibrium restrictions: $1 = · · · = $τ = 0. At t + 1, the CB
makes one additional commitment to keep the information horizon constant. However,
as of date t, Et [vt+τ+1] = 0, since there is no announcement at that point, and equilibrium
does not restrict $τ+1. Asymptotic communication renders future expectations of policy
shocks irrelevant, but does not anchor inflation expectations, which are indexed by θ1.
Consider the following result.
Proposition 4. Under announcements (vt+1,t, ...., vt+τ,t) and (p¯it+1,t, ...., p¯it+τ+1,t, 0, 0, ....), with
p¯i 6= 0, the stochastic path of inflation is indexed by the pair (θτ+1, $τ+1). As τ →∞, the stochastic
path of inflation is determined.
As before, announcements perturb expectations away from priors and add equilibrium
restrictions:
θ0 = $0 = − 1
φ− 1 , θ1 =
1
φ− 1 , θ2 = · · · = θτ = 0, $1 = · · · = $τ = 0.
The equilibrium restrictions θ1 = 1/(φ − 1), θ2 = · · · = θτ = 0 are derived from updat-
ing beliefs about productivity, and the matching of coefficients. The stochastic path of
inflation is equal to
pit+1 = − 1
φ− 1 ( at + vt) +
1
φ− 1at+1 + θτ+1Et+1[at+τ+1] +$τ+1vt+τ+1,
with Et+1[at+τ+1] 6= 0, since forecasts about expected inflation are updated at each date, so
that the information horizon is kept constant at τ periods ahead. Hence, state contingent
inflation depends on the arbitrary pair (θτ+1, $τ+1).
As τ →∞, equilibrium restrictions modify to
θ0 = $0 = − 1
φ− 1 , θ1 =
1
φ− 1 , θ2 = · · · = θτ = · · · = 0, $1 = · · · = $τ = · · · = 0,
and inflation reduces to
pit+1 = − 1
φ− 1 ( at + vt) +
1
φ− 1at+1. (13)
12
Asymptotic communication renders all future expectations of productivity innovations
and policy shocks irrelevant, so that it pins down the stochastic path of inflation.
Remark 1. In section 5, we show that the results apply intact to interest rate rules that target
current inflation and to alternative shock processes.
Myopia
The determination of the stochastic path of inflation requires the communication horizon
to match the planning horizon of agents. This requirement is restrictive when agents are
infinitely lived. A more appropriate framework requires equilibria that feature “myopia”.
Consider the following subclass of (C1):
pit+1 = θ0at +
∞∑
j=1
θ˜jEt+1 [at+j] +$0vt +
∞∑
j=1
ω˜jEt+1 [vt+j] , (C2)
with θ˜j = δj−1θj , ω˜j = δj−1$j , for j ≥ 1, and |δ| < 1, so that coefficients of expectation
terms converge to zero. All the previous results apply intact to (C2.) However, with
myopic beliefs, communication finite periods ahead is justifiable on the grounds that the
influence of arbitrary future expectations on state contingent inflation is negligible.
Zero lower bound
The analysis so far has ignored the zero lower bound; and in that case, keeping inflation
close to its target requires only announcements which contain forecasts about expected
inflation (deviations from systematic policy are not relevant, so we can as well set them to
zero, vt = 0 for all paths).
To incorporate the zero lower bound, we modify (3) as follows:
it = max {φEt[pit+1] + vt, 0} . (14)
If the lower bound binds, then the ability of the central bank to communicate its fore-
casts via its interest rate rule, and anchor the path of inflation, is limited. Here, we char-
acterise how deviations from systematic policy can keep the policy rate away form the
13
lower bound, in paths that it would have been binding under pure expected inflation tar-
geting (vt = 0). The central bank’s commitment policy with respect to these deviations is
path-dependent.
Without loss of generality, let us assume that the central bank receives noisy informa-
tion for the entire future, as of date zero (τ →∞). Stochastic paths where the zero bound
binds under vt = 0, require
φ
φ− 1
(
Et [at+1]− at
)
< 0, (15)
which is derived by substituting (E) into (14), and setting vt = 0. Alternatively, credible
promises to deviate from pure expected inflation targeting succeed in keeping the policy
rate away from the zero bound if and only if
1
φ− 1
{
φ(Et [at+1]− at)− vt
}
> 0, (16)
which is derived similarly to (15).
Starting from date zero, and considering all possible stochastic paths in the future, the
optimal commitment policy is as follows. For those paths that satisfy (15), the central bank
makes credible promises, as of date zero, to deviate from expected inflation targeting ac-
cording to (16); while for those paths that do not satisfy (15), it commits to zero deviations
from expected targeting. The commitment policy is clearly path-dependent. This argu-
ment resonates with Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)—albeit in an environment without
sticky prices—who argued that in the presence of the zero lower bound, the optimal com-
mitment policy is history-dependent; and also with Krugman (1998), who argued that
exiting the liquidity trap requires the central bank to promise to be irresponsible in the
future.
4 Comprehensive communication
We extend the set-up to incorporate demand shocks as well. As before, we continue as-
suming that only the central bank receives noisy information about shocks. To simplify
the argument, we abstract from monetary policy shocks, so that announcements about
14
the expected path of inflation are equivalent to announcements about the expected path
of interest rates.
Consider a white noise preference (demand) shock η, with η ∼ N(0, σ2η). The central
bank receives either a noisy signal on a or η, or two independent noisy signals on a and η,
which, in turn, are combined to a composite noisy signal on a− η. The information set of
the central bank modifies to
ΩCBt = {(. . . , at−1 , at), (. . . , ηt−1 , ηt), (. . . , st+τ,t)} , τ ≥ 1, (17)
where st+τ,t is a noisy signal as of date t about shocks at t+ τ .14
The Euler equation and (C1), respectively, modify to
Et [pit+1] =
1
φ− 1 [Et [at+1 − ηt+1] − (at − ηt)] (E2)
and
pit+1 =
∞∑
j=0
θjEt+1 [at+j] +
∞∑
j=0
κjEt+1 [ηt+j] . (C4)
The necessity of a more comprehensive framework for central bank communication
arises because announcements about the expected path of the nominal interest rate lead to
an identification problem. To see this, consider announcements (p¯it+1,t, ...., p¯it+τ+1,t, 0, 0, ....),
with p¯i 6= 0. Then, (E2) reduce to
p¯it+1,t =
1
φ− 1 [Et[at+1 − ηt+1] − (at − ηt)], (18)
...
p¯it+τ+1,t =
1
φ− 1 Et[(at+τ+1 − ηt+τ+1)− (at+τ − ηt+τ )], (19)
p¯it+τ+2,t = p¯it+τ+3,t = . . . = 0. (20)
14We continue assuming that each shock is i.i.d. and normally distributed with mean zero and finite
variance; all shocks are independent with each other; and, as before, the representative agent has common
priors with the central bank and knows the distribution of noise.
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Since p¯i 6= 0, announcements unambiguously reveal to the agent that the central bank has
received noisy information different from priors. However, and contrary to the previous
section, the agent can not back out the value of the noisy signal by combining the an-
nouncement with (18)-(20). The reason is that the announcement do not map uniquely to
the “type” of information that is available in the central bank’s information set. For exam-
ple, announcements might be consistent with noisy information on a or on η or on both
shocks for some periods, and only on one of the shocks for the rest of the communication
horizon, and so on. Thus, (18)-(20) allow for multiple possibilities, and exact identification
fails. However, exact identification is required to pin down the pairs (θj, κj), for j ≥ 0, in
(C4) and determine the path of inflation. (Imposing the additional equilibrium restriction
θj = −κj , implies that inflation depends arbitrarily on a − η, rather than on each shock
separately. Thus, exact identification is not required and following (18)-(20), anchoring
proceeds as in Section 3. However, this is an unappealing solution because anchoring
of beliefs over one shock, implies anchoring of beliefs over all other shocks; or equiva-
lently, the fact that the central bank has limited information about the fundamentals of the
economy is not relevant for monetary policy design.)
To overcome this identification problem, we propose the following characterisation.
Proposition 5. (Comprehensive communication) Effective communication requires to supplement
forecasts about the expected path of inflation with forecasts about the variance of inflation (news on
uncertainty).
Suppose the central bank receives noisy (independent) signals about both shocks τ pe-
riods ahead; and, at the beginning of each period, it receives additional noisy signals so
that the information horizon is kept constant to τ periods ahead. Announcing forecasts
about the expected path of inflation (interest rates), (p¯it+1,t, ...., p¯it+τ+1,t, 0, 0, ....), with p¯i 6= 0,
lead to an identification problem. The objective is to supplement these announcements
with forecasts about the variance of inflation. To that end, consider the following thought
experiment. Suppose the central bank, as of date t, were to communicate information di-
rectly, by announcing noisy composite signals on a − η—no identification problem with
direct communication—and rational agents were to update beliefs about shocks accord-
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ingly. Then, following the argument in Section 3, the path of inflation would have been
pit+1 = − 1
φ− 1 (at − ηt) +
1
φ− 1 (at+1 − ηt+1) + θτ+1Et+1 [at+τ+1] + κτ+1Et+1 [ηt+τ+1] ,
with θ0 = −κ0 = −1/ (φ− 1), θ1 = −κ1 = 1/ (φ− 1), and the pair (θτ+1, κτ+1) is arbitrary
since expectations are perturbed away from priors because of the updating of beliefs. The
conditional variance, as of date t, yields
V art [pit+1] = (1/ (φ− 1))2 V art (at+1 − ηt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
“fundamental uncertainty”
+ V art (θτ+1Et+1 [at+τ+1] + κτ+1Et+1 [ηt+τ+1])︸ ︷︷ ︸
“reducible uncertainty”
.
(21)
We decompose the conditional variance into two components: “fundamental uncertainty”
(FU, henceforth) and “reducible uncertainty” (RU, henceforth). The former is determined
unambiguously with the arrival of noisy information at date t about shocks at t + 1, and
imposes a lower bound on inflation volatility; while the latter is a function of the (non-
random) arbitrary pair (θτ+1, κτ+1) and reduces to zero as τ →∞.15
Continuing with our thought experiment, the path of inflation at t + j, j ≥ 2, would
have been
pit+j = − 1φ−1 (at+j−1 − ηt+j−1) + 1φ−1 (at+j − ηt+j) + θτ+1Et+j [at+τ+j] + κτ+1Et+j [ηt+τ+j] ,
with expectations determined by composite signals received at t + j about t + τ + j. The
expression for FU at t+ j, for 2 ≤ j ≤ τ , as of date t, is equal to
FUt+j,t =
(
1
φ− 1
)2 [
V art (at+j−1 − ηt+j−1) + V art (at+j − ηt+j)
]
; (22)
at t+ j, for j = τ + 1, as of date t, is equal to
FUt+j,t =
(
1
φ− 1
)2 [
V art (at+τ − ηt+τ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
t+j−1
+
(
σ2 + σ
2
η
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
t+j
]
; (23)
15The notation V ar (X) denotes the posterior variance of random variable X , conditional on a noisy
signal. FU is the variance of at+1 − ηt+1, conditional on a composite noisy signal received at date t; and is
equal to the inverse of the sum of the signal’s and prior’s precision. RU is the variance of the sum of the
expected value of each shock at t+2, conditional on a composite signal received at t+1. Updating requires
that each term is computed as in (6). Hence, RU is equal to the variance of the composite signal as of date t.
The covariance between FU and RU is zero because of independence.
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and at t+ j, for j > τ + 1, as of date t, is equal to
FUt+j,t =
(
1
φ− 1
)2 [ (
σ2 + σ
2
η
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
t+j−1
+
(
σ2 + σ
2
η
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
t+j
]
. (24)
Taken together, {FUt+j,t}∞j=2 is decomposed into a term attributed to shocks at t + j − 1,
and into another term attributed to shocks at t + j. Note that the t + j term of (23) and
the entire path of (24) are determined by prior variances. This is because the information
horizon for which the central bank receives noisy signals is always τ periods ahead as of
the current date t. This concludes our thought experiment.
Consider the following set of announcements:
(p¯it+1,t, .., p¯it+τ+1,t, 0, 0, ..) , (FUt+1,t,FUt+2,t, ..,FUt+j,t, ..) . (25)
Static identification proceeds through elimination of alternatives. Upon observing FUt+1,t =
(1/(φ− 1))2 V art (at+1 − ηt+1), the agent infers that the central bank has received noisy
signals, otherwise FUt+1,t = 0; and this information maps to both shocks, otherwise
FUt+1,t = (1/(φ− 1))2 V art (at+1) or FUt+1,t = (1/(φ− 1))2 V art (ηt+1). Subsequently, elim-
ination proceeds recursively. In particular, let us start with FUt+j,t, j = 2, given by expres-
sion (22). Inference on the first term has been established upon observing FUt+1,t. Next,
the agent juxtaposes the second term with the following alternatives: zero, which denotes
no arrival of noisy signals whatsoever; (1/(φ− 1)2)σ2 or (1/(φ− 1)2)σ2η , which denotes
the arrival of noisy signals at t + 1 about either productivity or demand shocks next pe-
riod; and (1/(φ− 1)2)V art (at+2) or (1/(φ− 1)2)V art (ηt+2), which denotes the arrival of
noisy signals at date t about either productivity or demand shocks at t + 2. Hence, the
agent infers that the central bank has or will receive information about both shocks. The
argument with respect to FUt+j,t, j ≥ 3, is similar.
Dynamic identification proceeds by comparing the change in variances between an-
nouncements. To see this, let us express (22)-(24) as follows:
FUt+2,t = FUt+1,t + (1/(φ− 1))2
[ (
σ2 + σ
2
η
)
+ ∆Vt+2,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
t+2
]
, (26)
FUt+j,t = (1/(φ− 1))2
[ (
σ2 + σ
2
η
)
+ ∆Vt+j−1,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
t+j−1
+
(
σ2 + σ
2
η
)
+ ∆Vt+j,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
t+j
]
, 3 ≤ j ≤ τ, (27)
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FUt+τ+1,t = (1/(φ− 1))2
[ (
σ2 + σ
2
η
)
+ ∆Vt+τ,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
t+j−1
+
(
σ2 + σ
2
η
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
t+j
]
, j = τ + 1, (28)
FUt+j,t = (1/(φ− 1))2
[ (
σ2 + σ
2
η
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
t+j−1
+
(
σ2 + σ
2
η
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
t+j
]
, j > τ + 1, (29)
which are obtained by adding and subtracting
(
σ2 + σ
2
η
)
in (22)-(24), that is, ∆Vt+j,t ≡
V art (at+j − ηt+j) −
(
σ2 + σ
2
η
)
, for 2 ≤ j ≤ τ . The term ∆Vt+j,t denotes the change in
variance at t+ j as of date t, relative to the prior distribution. The identification argument
relies on the condition ∆Vt+j,t 6= 0 (heteroskedasticity), so that announcements up to and
including τ periods ahead are away from priors, while announcements from τ+1 onwards
are consistent with prior variances. This is evident by observing (26)-(29). The upshot is
that heteroskedasticity between announcements allow the central bank to communicate
its information horizon effectively.
Next, the agent backs out the value of the signals from (p¯it+1,t, .., p¯it+τ+1,t, 0, 0, ..), fol-
lowing the argument of Proposition 2, update beliefs about shocks accordingly, and the
argument of Section 3 applies. Finally, note that the linearity structure of the equilibrium
separates “reducible” from “fundamental” uncertainty. Hence, it allows us to construct
announcements (25) based only on the latter type of uncertainty.
5 Extensions
Current inflation targeting
The analysis extends to interest rate rules that target current inflation:
it = φpit + vt, φ > 0, (30)
with a zero inflation target. Combining (30) with (2), yields
Et [pit+1] = φpit − (Et [at+1] − at − vt) , (E3)
and taking into account (E3), the inflation conjecture (C1) modifies as follows:
pit+1 = φpit +
∞∑
j=0
θjEt+1 [at+j] +
∞∑
j=0
$jEt+1 [vt+j] . (C5)
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Under the benchmark of “no communication”, the path of inflation is equal to
pit+1 = φpit + at + vt + θ1at+1 +$1vt+1,
with θ0 = $o = 1 by matching the expectation, as of date t, of (C5) with (E3). As before,
the stochastic path of inflation depends on the arbitrary pair (θ1, $1).
The result of Proposition 4 apply, and the stochastic path of inflation reduces to
pit+1 = φpit + at + vt − at+1 + θτ+1Et+1[at+τ+1] + $τ+1vt+τ+1,
with θ0 = $o = 1, θ1 = −1; and as τ →∞, the path of inflation reduces to
pit+1 = φpit + at + vt − at+1. (31)
The path of inflation is unique up to the initial price level. Moreover, if φ > 1, inflation
grows unboundedly large absent a terminal condition that requires inflation to converge
to its target. However, explosive solutions are well-defined equilibria in our set up since
the transversality condition rules out real but not nominal explosions (see Cochrane, 2011,
for a detailed explanation of this argument).
Shock processess
The analysis extends to non-zero mean processes, a =  ∼ N(µ, σ2 ), where µ 6= 0 and
finite. Conjecture (C1) modifies as follows:
pit+1 =
∞∑
j=0
θj (Et+1 [t+j] − µ) +
∞∑
j=0
$jEt+1 [vt+j] . (C6)
Setting ˜ = − µ, (C6) reduces to
pit+1 =
∞∑
j=0
θjEt+1 [˜t+j] +
∞∑
j=0
$jEt+1 [vt+j] , (C7)
and by adding and subtracting µ to (E), the analysis applies intact to (C7).
Alternatively, suppose productivity innovations follows an AR(1) process
at = γat−1 + t , 0 < γ < 1, (32)
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where  is i.i.d. with  ∼ N(0, σ2 ). Conjecture (C1) modifies as follows:
pit+1 = θ0at +
∞∑
j=1
θj (Et+1 [at+j]− γEt+1 [at+j−1]) +
∞∑
j=0
$jEt+1 [vt+j] , (C8)
and substituting (32) into (C8), yields
pit+1 = θ0at +
∞∑
j=1
θjEt+1 [t+j] +
∞∑
j=0
$jEt+1 [vt+j] . (C9)
Under no communication, and matching expectations of (E) and (C9), yields
θ0 = −1− γ
φ− 1 , $0 = −
1
φ− 1 , (33)
and state contingent inflation is indexed by (θ1, $1). The derivation of (33) requires the
addition and subtraction of γat to (E), and then do the matching of expectations.
6 Conclusion
We have developed a theoretical framework to study the role of comprehensive communi-
cation in anchoring inflation expectations. Communication of news on uncertainty about
the future economic outlook (high dimensional signals) provide an effective tool for cen-
tral baks to steer market expectations to their targeted path. This channel is particularly
important during times of crisis and market distress, where uncertainty about the future
outlook increases and traditional communication tools are not effective.
Turning to future work, it would be interesting to investigate the robustness of our
results in a set-up where the stochastic path of inflation affects the total allocation of re-
sources and the welfare of agents in the economy. In that case, information has a dual role.
On the one hand, it allows agents to resolve the identification problem, as discussed in this
paper, and on the other hand it has social value by affecting the allocation of resources and
welfare of agents.
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A Appendix
A.1 The economy
The frictionless economy in Section 2 corresponds to agents having preferences given by
E−1
∞∑
t=0
eηtβt
(
log (Ct) − 1
1 + ζ
N1+ζt
)
, (34)
where Ct denotes consumption in period t , Nt denotes employment in t , β ∈ (0, 1) de-
notes the agents’ discount factor, and ζ > 0 denotes the inverse ”Frisch” labor elasticity
and η is an i.i.d. preference shock with η ∼ N(0, σ2η).
Agents face a sequence of budget constraints given by
PtCt + QtBt+1 = Bt + WtNt + Ψt , (35)
where Pt denotes the consumption-good price in period t , Bt+1 denotes holdings of a
nominal riskless bond (in zero net supply) purchased in t and maturing in t+1 ,Qt denotes
the nominal bond price, Wt denotes the nominal wage, and Ψt denotes the firm’s profits.
A perfectly competitive firm operates a linear technology given by
Yt = AtNt , (36)
where Yt denotes production and At denotes productivity. Profits are given by
Ψt = Pt Yt − WtNt . (37)
A monetary authority sets the inverse nominal bond price (nominal interest rate) to tar-
get expected inflation. In a rational expectations equilibrium under an expected inflation
targeting rule, agents solve their problems, which we specify below, and markets clear at
the stated prices, that is Yt = Ct , Ndt = N st , and Bt+1 = 0 for all t with B0 = 0 .
Given B0 = 0 agents decide how much to consume, save in the nominal bond, and
work to maximize their expected utility (34) subject to the sequence of budget constraints
(35) and a standard no-Ponzi-scheme constraint. Their optimality conditions are
N ζt =
Wt
PtCt
(38)
22
Qt = β Et
[
eηt+1−ηt
1
Πt+1
Ct
Ct+1
]
. (39)
Equation (38) is the usual intratemporal labor supply condition and (39) is the Euler equa-
tion.
Firms maximise profits and they accommodate any labor supplied at a wage given by
Wt = PtAt . (40)
We restrict attention to linear rational expectations equilibria and, to this end, we con-
sider an interest-rate rule given by
it = − log β + φEt [pit+1 − pi] + vt, (41)
where we define it ≡ − logQt and let pit denote log-inflation, defined as pit ≡ pt − pt−1 ,
pi the inflation target and v are i.i.d. policy shocks with v ∼ N(0, σ2v).
The optimality conditions (38)-(40), technology (36) and market clearing, in log-linear
form are
ζnt = wt − pt − ct, (42)
ct = const − it + Et [ct+1 + pit+1] + ηt − Et [ηt+1] , (43)
wt = at + pt, (44)
yt = nt + at, (45)
yt = ct. (46)
Expressions (42)-(46) lead to eqs. (1) and (2) in the main text—abstracting from preference
shocks that will be introduced in section 4.
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A.2 The equilibria without approximations
In the previous section we considered a log-linear approximation of the Euler equation.
This is with no loss of generality because higher-order (here, only second-order) terms
appear as constants, which we have suppressed. To ”unsuppress” the constant terms, we
will take the same steps as in the Appendix of Rousakis (2013). Without loss of generaliy,
and to simplify the argument, we abstract from preference and policy shocks.
Define xt ≡ log(Xt). We can rewrite (39) as:
elogQt = elog β Et
[
e−pit+1+ at− at+1
]
, (47)
where we have used the equilibrium condition yt = ct = at . Using (41) (remember
it ≡ − logQt) and assuming a white noise productivity process, at = t , (47) simplifies
to
e−φEt [pit+1−pi] = Et
[
e−pit+1+ t− t+1
]
. (48)
We allow noisy information about productivity up to τ periods ahead, where τ ≥ 0 ,
given by (5). Next, conjecture (C1), allowing a constant term, abstracting from policy
shocks and taking into account information up to τ periods ahead, reduces to
pit+1 = θ−1 +
τ+1∑
j=0
θjEt+1 [t+j]. (AC)
Using (AC), the LHS in (48) becomes:
e−φEt [pit+1−pi] = e−φ{θ−1+
∑τ
j=0 θjEt [t+j ]−pi}, (49)
where we have used the fact that Et [t+τ+1] = 0 because, by assumption, agents have
information up to τ periods ahead.
The RHS in (48) becomes:
Et
[
e−pit+1+ t− t+1
]
= etEt
[
e− (pit+1+ t+1)
]
= et−Et[pit+1+ t+1] +
1
2
V art [pit+1+ t+1] , (50)
where the last equality follows from the fact that pit+1 + t+1 is normally distributed (hence
epit+1+ t+1 is log-normally distributed), while V art [·] denotes variance of a variable condi-
tional on Ωt. Using (AC), eq. (50) becomes:
Et [e
−pit+1+ t− t+1 ] = et−{θ−1+Et [t+1] +
∑τ
j=0 θjEt [t+j ]}+ 12{[(1+θ1)2+
∑τ
j=2 θ
2
j ] (σ
−2
e +σ
−2
 )
−1+ θ2τ+1 σ
2
 },
(51)
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where we use the fact that
t+1 ∼ N (µ st+1, (σ−2e + σ−2 )−1),
t+2 ∼ N (µ st+2, (σ−2e + σ−2 )−1),
...
t+τ ∼ N (µ st+τ , (σ−2e + σ−2 )−1),
t+τ+1 ∼ N (0, σ2 )
and µ = (σe)−2/ ((σe)−2 + (σ)−2) .
Matching coefficients in (49) and (51) yields:
−φ (θ−1 − pi) = − θ−1 + 1
2
{[(1 + θ1)2 +
τ∑
j=2
θ2j ] (σ
−2
e + σ
−2
 )
−1 + θ2τ+1 σ
2
} (52)
−φ θ0 = 1 − θ0 (53)
−φ θ1 = − (1 + θ1) (54)
θ2 = . . . = θτ = 0 . (55)
We can rearrange (52-(55) as:
θ−1 = − 1
2 (φ− 1)
{(
φ
φ− 1
)2
(σ−2e + σ
−2
 )
−1 + θ2τ+1 σ
2

}
+
φ
φ− 1 pi (56)
θ0 = − 1
φ− 1 (57)
θ1 =
1
φ− 1 (58)
θ2 = . . . = θτ = 0 . (59)
Observe that the solution is the same as the one in the main text and, crucially, θt+τ+1 is
indeterminate. The only difference compared to the main text is the presence of the now
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unsuppressed constant term, θ−1 , which captures the slope of the Euler equation. Ob-
serve that the constant term depends on θt+τ+1 , hence the constant term is indeterminate
too. One may, therefore, be tempted to argue that, unlike the point made in Nakajima and
Polemarchakis (2005), it is also mean inflation that remains indeterminate; this is not cor-
rect. What we have shown is that the mean of log-inflation is indeterminate, which should
come as no surprise given that the mean of a log-normally distributed variable depends
on its variance.
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Table 1: Timeline of selected communication and transparency innovations for major
central banks
Note: Reprinted from Haldane (2017).
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